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Abstract:-The security of wireless sensor networks is a challenging
problem in the process of data aggregation. As data are send though
sensor network confidentiality plays and important role between
sink and destination. An efficient secure data aggregation is
proposed to enhance the data security of wireless sensor networks.
In wireless sensor networks, compromised sensor nodes can inject
false data during both data aggregation and data forwarding. The
existing false data detection techniques consider false data
injections during data forwarding only and do not allow any change
on the data by data aggregation. However, In this paper we can see
how the data is being remain confidential between sink and
destination by using Data authentication method for securing the
data in wireless sensor network.

The security of wireless sensor networks is a
challenging problem in the process of data aggregation.
An efficient secure data aggregation is proposed to
enhance the data security of wireless sensor networks.
Firstly, the secure in-network aggregation tree is
introduced, then a judgment method based on trust
schema was used to detect whether a sensor node has
potential misbehavior. After the detection, a local
recovery schema is proposed to reduce the possibility to
become isolated nodes, which will increase the security
level in data aggregation in wireless sensor networks.
The performance analysis shows the efficiency of the
schema. The sensor networks we considered is
composed of high densely deployed sensor nodes. All
the sensor nodes in the networks can be deployed into
an hierarchal cluster architecture using

Index Terms-Data aggregation, data integrity, network-level
security, sensor networks.

I. INTRODUCTION
WIRELESS sensor networks are vulnerable to many
types of security attacks, including false data injection,
data forgery, and eavesdropping [1]. Sensor nodes can
be compromised by intruders, and the compromised
nodes can distort data integrity by injecting useless
data. The transmission of useless data depletes the
constrained battery power and degrades the bandwidth
utilization. Useless data can be injected by
compromised sensor nodes in various ways, including
data aggregation and relaying. Data aggregation is
essential to reduce data redundancy and to improve data
accuracy. In addition to useless data detection, data
confidentiality is required by many sensor network
applications
to
provide
safeguard
against
eavesdropping.

some underlying schemes. The clusters are nonoverlapping and the cluster head usually perform and
aggregation operation on all the reading from the
cluster members
belonging to this cluster. Each cluster member can
sense the data in the region and can directly
communicate with its cluster head to forward its
readings results. In some cases, some sensor nodes in
this network can be assigned as gateways that can
connect all the cluster heads together and transmit their
aggregating results to the base station. Sometimes the
gateways assigned in the network also have the same
sensing capability as other cluster members all received
invitation messages.

II. RELATED WORK

1)Efficient Secure in-network Data Aggregation in

2)Securing
Data

Data

Aggregation

Wireless Sensor networks:-

Injection in Wireless Sensor Networks
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and collective false-report-detection
forwarding nodes.

This method proposes a secured data aggregation
protocol which detects the false data injection during
the data aggregation and identifies the adversary node.
The protocol is lightweight because it requires only a
minimal cryptographic techniques, and takes O(n) time
for both data aggregation and tracking back the
attacker. Each node shares a unique pairwise key with
the base station for authenticated communication
between them. Such keys are pre -installed to nodes
before the sensor network is deployed.

by

multiple

In this method we present a Statistical En-route
Filtering
Mechanism (SEF). SEF exploits the sheer scale and
dense
Deployment of large sensor networks. To prevent
any single Compromised node from breaking down the
entire system, SEF carefully
limits the amount of
security information assigned to any single node, and
relies on the collective decisions of multiple sensors
for false report detection. When a sensing target
(henceforth called “stimulus” or “event”) occurs in the
field, multiple surrounding sensors collectively generate
a legitimate report that carries multiple message
authentication codes (MACs). A report with an
inadequate number of MACs will not be delivered. As a
sensing report is forwarded towards the sink over
multiple hops, each forwarding node verifies the
correctness of the MACs carried in the report with
certain probability. Once an incorrect MAC is detected,
the report is dropped. The probability of detecting
incorrect MACs increases with the number of hops the
report travels. Depending on the path length, there is a
non-zero probability that some reports with incorrect
MACs may escape en-route filtering and be delivered to
the sink. In any case the sink will further verify the
correctness of each MAC carried in each report and
reject false data.

The proposed solution uses a simple aggregation tree
such as a spanning tree constructed by breadth-first
search as in ENCAST[9].The sink node floods a
discovery message, which is propagated throughout the
network. After the flooding, every node knows who are
its immediate neighbor nodes and can form a shortest
path tree by selecting one of them as its parent.
Aggregation tree may be reconstructed periodically,
and the base station does not know the topology of the
tree (it would be too costly for the base station to learn
such information).
The proposed solution requires two kinds of pairwise
keys. One is shared between a node and the base station
so that the base station can authenticate his message.
Such keys are installed before the network is deployed,
hence do not require any run-time establishment or
management. The other is shared between a node and
his parent so that the parent can authenticate his
message. Although these keys do require runtime
establishment and management, most existing solutions
build more expensive cryptosystem on top of them.

III PROPOSED PLAN
In the proposed plan, to support data aggregation along
with data confidential, the monitoring nodes of every
data aggregator also conduct data aggregation and
compute the corresponding small-size message
authentication codes for data verification at their
pairmates. To support confidential data transmission,
the sensor nodes between two consecutive data
aggregators verify the data integrity on the encrypted
data rather than the plain data. There are T numbers of
nodes between two consecutive forwarding nodes or we
can say that between two data aggregator. The
transmission of false data depletes the constrained
battery power and degrades the bandwidth utilization.
False data can be injected by compromised sensor
nodes in various ways, including data aggregation and
relaying. Because data aggregation is essential to
reduce data redundancy and/or to improve data
accuracy, false data detection is critical to the provision
of data integrity and efficient utilization of battery
power and bandwidth. In addition to false data

3)Statistical En-route Filtering of Injected False
Data
In Sensor Networks

Statistical En-route Filtering (SEF) mechanism that can
detect and drop such false reports. SEF requires that
each sensing report be validated by multiple keyed
message authentication d e s (MACS), each generated
by a node that detects the same event. As the report is
forwarded, each node along the way verifies the
correctness of the MACS probabilistically and drops
those with invalid MACs at earliest points. The sink
further filters out remaining false reports that escape the
en-route filtering. SEF exploits the network scale to
terminal the truthfulness of each report through
collective decision-making by multiple detecting nodes
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authentication protocol (DAA) to provide false data
detection and secure data aggregation against up to T
compromised sensor nodes, for T>=1. The value of T
depends on security requirements, node density, packet
size and the amount of tolerable overhead. We assume
that some sensor nodes are selected dynamically as data
aggregators, and the nodes between two consecutive
data aggregators are called forwarding nodes simply
because they forward data. To detect false data injected
by a data aggregator while performing data aggregation,
some neighboring nodes of the data aggregator (called
monitoring nodes) also perform data aggregation and
compute MACs for the aggregated data to enable their
pairmates to verify the data later. DAA also provides
data confidentiality as data are forwarded between data
aggregators. To provide data confidentiality during data
forwarding between every two consecutive data
aggregators, the aggregated data are encrypted at data
aggregators, and false data detection is performed over
the encrypted data rather than the plain data. Whenever
the verification of encrypted data fails at a forwarding
node, the data are dropped immediately to minimize the
waste of resources such as bandwidth and battery power
due to false data injection. The Commutative Cipher
based En-route Filtering scheme (CCEF) [4] drops false
data en-route without symmetric key sharing. In CCEF,
the source node establishes a secret association with
base station on a per-session basis, while the
intermediate forwarding nodes are equipped with a
witness key. With the use of a commutative cipher [8],
a forwarding node can use the witness key to verify the
authenticity of the reports without knowing the original
session key. In the dynamic en-route filtering scheme
[5], false data are filtered in a probabilistic nature in the
sense that a forwarding node can validate the
authenticity of a report only if it has a corresponding
authentication key. A legitimate report is endorsed by
multiple sensor nodes using their distinct authentication
keys from one-way hash chains.

detection, data confidentiality is required by many
sensor network applications to provide safeguard
against eavesdropping.

Fig: An example of forming sensor pairs to authenticate
data for the false data detection scheme, where data
aggregation is not allowed if it requires any change in
the data.

Data confidentiality prefers data to be encrypted at the
source
node and decrypted at the destination. However, data
aggregation techniques usually require any encrypted
sensor data to be decrypted at data aggregators for
aggregation. The existing false data detection
algorithms [2]–[5] address neither data aggregation nor
confidentiality. Although they could be modified easily
to support data confidentiality, it is a challenge for them
to support the data aggregation that alters data. For
instance, the basic idea behind the false data detection
algorithm is to form pairs of sensor nodes such that one
pairmate computes a message authentication code
(MAC) of forwarded data and the other pairmate later
verifies the data using the MAC, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
In this scheme, any data change between two pairmates
is considered as false data injection, and therefore, data
aggregation is not allowed if it requires alterations in
the data. Hence, the false data detection algorithm
cannot be implemented when a data aggregator between
two pairmates changes the data. Data aggregation is
implemented in wireless sensor networks to eliminate
data redundancy, reduce data transmission, and improve
data accuracy. Data aggregation results in better
bandwidth and battery utilization [6] which enhances
the network lifetime because communication
constitutes 70% of the total energy consumption of the
network [7]. Although data aggregation is very useful,
it could cause some security problems because a
compromised data aggregator may inject false data
during data aggregation. When data aggregation is
allowed, the false data detection technique should
determine correctly whether any data alteration is due
to data aggregation or false data injection. A joint data
aggregation and false data detection technique has to
ensure that data are altered by data aggregation only.
This method introduces a data aggregation and
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4) Limitations

Fig.2 The system architecture of sensor nodes used by
DAA. To support false data detection, secure data
aggregation, and confidentiality against up to T
compromised sensor nodes, DAA forms 2T+1 pairs of
sensor nodes by the neighboring and forwarding nodes
of Au and Af.

In this subsection, we list the limitations of DAA due to
the above assumptions. First of all, the value of T
depends strictly on several factors such as geographical
area conditions, modes of deployment, transmission
range of sensor nodes, power management, and node
density of the network.

IV. NETWORK MODEL
The main work in network model is selection of data
aggregator, secure data aggregator selection protocol
(SANE) is used for selection of the data aggregator and
data aggregator is selected by taking following
condition into account.

V. DAA (DATA AGGREGATION AND AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOL)
The DAA(Data aggregator and authentication Protocol
) are mainly divided into three group are as follow
1) Monitor node selection (MNS)

1) The data aggregator should have high residual
energy.

2) Forming pairs of sensor node

2) There should be more no. of neighboring node near
the data aggregator.

3) Secure data arrogation and false data detection.

1) Selection of Data Aggregator

In DAA we have to select Current data aggregator,
forward data aggregator and backward data aggregator
node

The protocol SANE is first run to select candidate data
aggregators. Since sector size is determined based on
the value of T, the number of intermediate nodes
between any two consecutive candidates aggregators is
expected to be around. If it happens that there are less
than T intermediate nodes between two consecutive
candidate aggregators, one of these candidate
aggregators drops its candidacy, and then the protocol
SANE is run again. This process is repeated until there
are at least intermediate nodes between any two
consecutive data aggregators.

A. Monitor node selection (MNS)
The Monitor node selection for an aggregator to
perform secure data aggregation, each data aggregator
is monitored by its T neighboring nodes out of total n
neighboring nodes, for n>=T. Therefore, in the first step
of DAA, T neighbors of data aggregator Au are selected
as monitoring nodes to perform the data aggregation
and to compute subMACs of the aggregated data. The
monitoring nodes are selected by the Monitoring Node
Selection (MNS) algorithm, as shown in Fig. 4. The
basic idea behind the selection of monitoring nodes for
each data aggregator in Algorithm MNS is to assign
indices to the neighboring nodes in some order and then
compute T indices by applying modulus operation to
the sum of some random numbers generated by the
neighboring nodes. Any neighboring node whose index
is equal to one of these T indices becomes a monitoring
node. The data aggregator and all neighboring nodes
are involved with the selection of monitoring nodes to
minimize the adverse impact of a compromised node.

2) Generation of MAC
In this model only data aggregators are allowed to
encrypt and decrypt the aggregated data. The
forwarding nodes first verify data integrity using MACs
and then relay the data if it is not false.
3) Pairwise key establishment
It is assumed that a monitoring node can establish a
pairwise shared key with its pairmate that is multiple
hops away. By using random key distribution protocols,
monitoring nodes can ensure the identity of their
pairmates, thereby preventing Sybil attacks where a
compromised node fakes multiple identities to establish
pair relations with more than one monitoring node.

B. Forming Pairs of Sensor Nodes
DAA assumes that a path already exists between any
two consecutive data aggregators via forwarding nodes,
and that each data aggregator uses only one outgoing
path towards base station at a given time. To establish
pairs among monitoring nodes and forwarding nodes,
Af sends out a “pairmate discovery message” M to Au

International Journal of Smart Sensors and Ad Hoc Networks (IJSSAN) Volume-1, Issue-1, 2011

69

False Data Detection in Wireless Sensor Network with Secure communication

data. Previously known techniques on false data
detection do not support data confidentiality and
aggregation, even though they are usually essential to
wireless sensor networks. However, this paper has
presented the novel security protocol DAA to integrate
data aggregation, confidentiality, and false data
detection.

to along with its neighboring node list. Af Also adds the
MAC of neighboring node list using the key it shares
with Au. Message is forwarded by the nodes on the
path between Af and Au, and each node that forwards
M appends its ID to M . When Au receives M, it has the
IDs of its forwarding nodes and neighboring nodes of
Af. Let’s assume that there are K forwarding nodes
(k>=T) between Au and Af . To form the pairs among
’s monitoring nodes and forwarding nodes,
concatenates the IDs of the forwarding nodes in a
random order and indexes them 1 to k . Then, Au
computes the MAC of the concatenated IDs and
broadcasts the MAC and k.
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C. Integration of Secure Data Aggregation and False
Data
Detection
This section introduces Algorithm SDFC to provide
false data
detection, secure
confidentiality for

data

aggregation

and

data

the third step of DAA. To provide data confidentiality,
transmitted data are always encrypted and forwarding
nodes perform the data verification over the encrypted
data. Prior to this third step of DAA, monitoring nodes
of every data aggregator are selected, and pairs 2T+1
are formed. To verify data integrity and detect false
data injections, one pairmate computes a subMAC, and
the other pairmate verifies the subMAC. subMACs are
computed for both plain and encrypted data. subMACs
of plain data are used to detect false data injections
during data aggregation, whereas subMACs of
encrypted data are used to detect false data injections
during data forwarding. To detect any false data that the
current data aggregator Au can inject during data
aggregation, the monitoring nodes of also aggregate the
incoming data of and compute subMACs for the plain
aggregated data, so that the forward data aggregator and
its neighboring nodes verify the subMACs. Similarly,
to detect those false data that can be injected during
data forwarding, the monitoring nodes of
compute subMACs for the encrypted aggregated data
and then
their pairmates of forwarding nodes verify the
subMACs.
CONCLUSION
In the wireless sensor networks, compromised sensor
nodes can distort the integrity of data by injecting false
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